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CITIZEN ACCESS AND GOVERNMENT SECRECY 
PAUL HARIDAKIS* 
INTRODUCTION 
Like July 4, 1776, and June 7, 1941, September 11, 2001 is indelibly 
imprinted on the minds of most United States citizens, and has had profound 
effects on the operation of our Government.  In the aftermath of the 
devastating September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the Pentagon and World 
Trade Center, the executive branch was reorganized with the creation of the 
Department of Homeland Security and significant government initiatives (e.g., 
the USA PATRIOT Act, the authorization of military tribunals, closing 
deportation proceedings, classifying previously public information, expanding 
executive privilege and control of presidential records) to enhance the 
government’s capacity to wage a war on terrorism were implemented.1 
Many of these initiatives permit the executive branch to withhold 
information from the press and public at its discretion.2  These initiatives have 
generated tremendous debate as some officials support the proposals as added 
protections for the United States and its citizens while others expressed 
 
* Paul Haridakis (J.D., Ph.D) is an associate professor in the School of Communication Studies at 
Kent State University. 
 1. See, e.g., Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat, 2135 (codified 
in scattered sections of the U.S.C.); Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate 
Tools required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001 (“USA PATRIOT Act”), Pub. L. 
No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (codified in scattered sections of the U.S.C.); Detention, Treatment, 
and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War Against Terrorism, 66 Fed. Reg. 57,833 (Nov. 16, 
2001); Memorandum from Chief Immigration Judge Michael J. Creppy to Immigration Judges 
and Court Administrators (Sept. 21, 2001), available at http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/aclu/ 
creppy092101memo.pdf (directing immigration judges to close hearings to the public in certain 
cases in which the Attorney General has implemented additional security procedures); Emanuel 
Gross, The Influence of Terrorist Attacks on Human Rights in the United States: The Aftermath of 
September 11, 2001, 28 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 1 (2002); Jan C. Ting, Unobjectionable But 
Insufficient—Federal Initiatives in Response to the September 11 Terrorist Attacks, 34 CONN. L. 
REV. 1145 (2002). 
 2. For a discussion of the Bush Administration’s efforts to curtail discretionary disclosures, 
see James T. O’Reilly, “Access to Records” verses “Access to Evil:” Should Disclosure Laws 
Consider Motives as a Barrier to Records Release?, 12 KAN J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 559, 568-69 
(2003). 
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concern that they give the government too much latitude to engage in 
clandestine activities without the public’s knowledge.3 
This is no simple dilemma to resolve.  There is always a need, particularly 
during times of war, to protect the republic, the collective rights of citizens, 
and homeland security.  But, of course, the obligation to protect individual 
rights always remains.  In the current atmosphere in which the United States is 
fighting a war in Iraq, and simultaneously an ongoing war against terrorism, 
we find ourselves in a period of perceived crisis.  In light of efforts taken by 
the government in the 21st century to control and withhold information from 
the public about the war on terrorism, the tension between the public’s desire 
to obtain government-controlled information and the government’s desire to 
withhold it is particularly salient. 
The tension between these competing interests is not a recent phenomenon.  
The right of “the people” to receive information has been referenced by 
political leaders and scholars since the founding of the United States.4  
However, the Supreme Court has not provided definitive guidance regarding 
the extent to which the First Amendment protects a public right of access 
mandating government openness. 
However, one thing is certain: finding the proper balance between 
protecting homeland security and maintaining the integrity and accountability 
of government bodies comes down to resolving the extent of the public’s right 
to access information necessary to make judgments about government activity. 
This paper focuses on the extent of the public’s First Amendment right to 
access information, including information pertaining to actions taken by the 
government in the War on Terrorism.  However, a comprehensive review of all 
 
 3. For recent reviews and commentary on various such initiatives, see Patrice McDermott, 
Withhold and Control: Information in the Bush Administration, 12 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 671 
(2003); James T. O’Reilly, FOIA and Fighting Terror: The Elusive Nexus Between Public Access 
and Terrorist Attack, 64 LA. L. REV. 809 (2004); Mary-Rose Papandrea, Under Attack: The 
Public’s Right to Know and the War on Terror, 25 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 35 (2005); Susan 
Dente Ross, Secrecy’s Assault on the Constitutional Right to Open Trials, 40 IDAHO L. REV. 351 
(2004); Kim Lane Scheppele, Law in a Time of Emergency: States of Exception and the 
Temptations of 9/11, 6 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1001 (2004); Rena Steinzor, “Democracies Die 
Behind Closed Doors:” The Homeland Security Act and Corporate Accountability, 132 KAN. J.L. 
& PUB. POL’Y 641 (2003); Christina E. Wells, Information Control in Times of Crisis: The Tools 
of Repression, 30 OHIO N.U.L. REV. 451 (2004); Keith Anderson, Note, Is There Still a “Sound 
Legal Basis?:” The Freedom of Information Act in the Post-9/11 World, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 1605 
(2003); Bradley Pack, Note, FOIA Frustration: Access to Government Records Under the Bush 
Administration, 46 ARIZ. L. REV. 815 (2004); Darren W. Stanhouse, Comment, Ambition and 
Abdication: Congress, The Presidency, and the Evolution of the Department of Homeland 
Security, 29 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 691 (2004). 
 4. See, e.g., Eric B. Easton, Public Importance: Balancing Proprietary Interests and the 
Right to Know, 21 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 139, 144-49 (2003) (discussing the development 
of “right to know” jurisprudence). 
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of the ways the PATRIOT Act and other government initiatives may affect 
citizen access to information cannot be addressed comprehensively in a single 
paper.  Similarly, comprehensive coverage of all case law and commentary 
throughout the years pertaining to the public’s First Amendment right of access 
to government information and practices also cannot be addressed adequately 
in a single paper.  Accordingly, the discussion must be both representative and 
illustrative. 
This essay will be organized in four parts.  First, I will review 
representative literature and case law pertaining to the extent of the First 
Amendment right of access to information.  Second, I will briefly discuss the 
Freedom of Information Act, the principle piece of federal legislation 
pertaining to public access to government records.  Third, I will review 
representative examples of government action during the War on Terrorism 
that has constrained public access to information held by the government.  
Finally, I will attempt to place recent executive branch actions, which have 
been cloaked in secrecy, in historical context. 
THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND ACCESS TO INFORMATION 
The importance of public access to information and visibility of 
government processes cannot be overstated.  The right of citizens to receive 
information about government activities is a notion that predates the United 
States Constitution.5  Thomas Jefferson wrote in the Declaration of 
Independence that governments derive their authority from the consent of the 
governed.6  Jefferson’s concept of self-governance formed the foundation upon 
which our Federal Constitution is based.7 
Given these central tenets of United States democratic principles (i.e., that 
it is a republic based on public consent and the right of “the people” to dictate 
the itinerary of their government), various jurists have advanced the idea that 
the right of access to information should be fostered and protected by the First 
Amendment.8  Put succinctly, the citizens, not the government, should decide 
what information is needed to participate in self-governance.9 
 
 5. See William H. Rehnquist, Thomas Jefferson and His Contemporaries, 9 J.L. & POL’Y 
595, 607-08 (1993). 
 6. Id. 
 7. See Thomas B. McAffee, Does the Federal Constitution Incorporate the Declaration of 
Independence?, 1 NEV. L.J. 138, 144 (2001). 
 8. See, e.g., Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U.S. 301, 308 (1965) (Brennan J., 
concurring) (arguing that the public right to receive information is so fundamental that the 
government is limited in its authority to interfere with it). 
 9. Id. 
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Although self-governance does not mean that the people rule in a practical 
sense, “they do judge those who do.”10  Thus, it has been argued that “[t]he 
dominant purpose of the First Amendment was to prohibit . . . governmental 
suppression of embarrassing information” and that “[s]ecrecy in government is 
fundamentally anti-democratic.”11 
The view that access to information is the foundation upon which other 
freedoms rest has significant historical support.12  For example, when 
criticizing the Sedition Act of 1798, enacted at the end of the 18th century, one 
of our founders, James Madison, referred to the freedom to “examine public 
characters and measures, and of free communication thereon” as “the only 
effectual guardian of every other right.”13  In the 19th century, legal 
philosopher Jeremy Bentham added that “in comparison of publicity, all other 
checks are of small account.”14  Similarly, in the late 20th century former 
Supreme Court Justice William Brennan claimed that the exercise of public 
debate and other civic behavior rests on the “antecedent assumption” that it 
“must be informed.”15  When specifically considering the intent of our 
founders, legal historian Harold Cross argued that “the struggle for freedom of 
speech and of the press bars any notion that the men of 1791 intended to 
provide for freedom to disseminate such information but to deny freedom to 
acquire it.”16 
On the other hand, there is historical evidence that the extent of the right to 
access information is not as robust as such esteemed advocates suggested.  
Apparently, at least some of our founders were not greatly concerned with the 
right of access.  Evidence of the lack of concern for the free flow of 
information includes the secret proceedings at the Constitutional Convention of 
1787, the closed debate concerning the adoption of the Bill of Rights, and the 
private meetings of the United States Senate prior to 1795.17  In addition, some 
 
 10. Marci A. Hamilton & Clemens G. Kohnen, The Jurisprudence of Information Flow: 
How the Constitution Constructs the Pathways of Information, 25 CARDOZO L. REV. 267, 272 
(2003). 
 11. New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 723-24 (1971) (Douglas, J., 
concurring). 
 12. See, e.g., HAROLD CROSS, THE PEOPLE’S RIGHT TO KNOW xiii-xiv (1954); Timothy B. 
Dyk, News Gathering, Press Access, and the First Amendment, 44 STAN. L. REV. 927, 959 
(1992). 
 13. Dyk, supra note 12, at 959. 
 14. See Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 569 (1980) (quoting JEREMY 
BENTHAM, 1 RATIONALE OF JUDICIAL EVIDENCE 524 (1827)). 
 15. Id. at 587 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
 16. CROSS, supra note 12, at 131-32. 
 17. See Martin E. Halstuk, Policy of Secrecy-Pattern of Deception: What Federalist Leaders 
Thought About a Public Right to Know, 1794-98, 7 COMM. L. & POL’Y 51, 57-60 (2002). 
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of the earliest United States legislation on record authorized executive branch 
departments to withhold documents from the public at their discretion.18 
Delineating the extent of the public’s right of public access to information 
is complicated by the fact that the Supreme Court has never specifically ruled 
there is a universal constitutional right of access.  Although the Court has held 
that such a right exists in particularized settings, its rulings regarding the right 
of access have been limited to specific settings.19 
The Right of Access to Judicial Proceedings 
Perhaps the most well articulated case dealing with the right of access to 
information is the Supreme Court’s 1980 opinion in Richmond Newspapers v. 
Virginia, which held that the press and public have a First Amendment right of 
access to trial proceedings.20 Justice Burger, writing for the plurality, explained 
that it was “not crucial whether we describe this right to attend criminal 
trials . . . as a ‘right of access,’ or a ‘right to gather information.’”21  Openness, 
Justice Burger said, “may be seen as assured by the amalgam of the First 
Amendment guarantees of speech and press.”22  He further claimed that access 
was relevant to the First Amendment right of assembly, in part because 
“[p]eople assemble in public places not only to speak or to take action, but also 
to listen, observe, and learn.”23  Thus, when the Court ruled in Richmond 
Newspapers that the public had a First Amendment right to attend trials, it 
found that access was guaranteed specifically because access fostered First 
Amendment values.24 
Given such broad pronouncements about the strength of the right of access, 
the Court could have easily ruled that the right is fundamental and not merely 
limited to judicial proceedings.  However, the Court did not do so.25  In fact, in 
a concurring opinion, Justice Brennan articulated two important considerations 
he believed the Court should use in determining whether access in particular 
settings was warranted.26  The first consideration was whether there was a 
sufficient tradition of openness justifying access “to particular proceedings or 
 
 18. See Papandrea, supra note 3, at 48 (discussing the Housekeeping Statue of 1789, 1 Stat. 
68 (1789)). 
 19. See generally, Eugene Cerruti, “Dancing in the Courthouse:” The First Amendment 
Right of Access Opens a New Round, 29 U. RICH. L. REV. 237 (1995). 
 20. 448 U.S. 555, 581 (1980). 
 21. Id. at 576 (citations omitted). 
 22. Id. at 577. 
 23. Id. at 578. 
 24. Id. at 580. 
 25. Id. at 585-86. 
 26. Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 589 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
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information.”27  The second consideration was whether there was a structural 
value of openness—that is, whether access benefited the process at issue.28 
Using this two-part experience and logic rationale, the Court in subsequent 
cases ruled that the right of public access extended to settings ancillary to the 
trial itself, such as jury selection29 and pretrial hearings.30  In addition, lower 
courts applying the Court’s Richmond Newspapers rationale found a right of 
access to civil trials, administrative proceedings, and some fact-finding 
hearings.31  However, the Supreme Court has always stopped short of 
concluding that the right of access is guaranteed in settings other than judicial 
proceedings and those ancillary to them.32 
A Lack of Access in Non-Judicial Settings 
In some contexts, the Court has specifically rejected the argument that the 
First Amendment mandates a right of access to government activities and 
information.33  Rulings by the Supreme Court in three pre-Richmond 
Newspapers cases are often cited to support the argument that the First 
Amendment does not guarantee a right of access to such information.34  In Pell 
v. Procunier and Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., journalists challenged a 
California prison rule and a Federal Bureau of Prisons rule, respectively, which 
prohibited media interviews with particular inmates of the media’s choosing.35  
In Houchins v. KQED the media challenged a local sheriff’s denial of access to 
a portion of a jail.36  In each case, the Court ruled that journalists did not have 
a constitutional right of particularized access to such facilities beyond that 
enjoyed by the general public.37 
Although the Court was dealing with media rights of access in these three 
cases, the implication was that the public did not have such a right of access, 
which is why the media also lacked the right.38  In an earlier case, the Court 
provided illustrative examples of settings where the media, and by implication 
 
 27. Id. This is sometimes referred to as “experience.”  See, e.g., Detroit Free Press v. 
Ashcroft, 303 F.3d 681, 695 (6th Cir. 2002). 
 28. Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 589, 598.  This is sometimes referred to as “logic.”  
See, e.g., Detroit Free Press, 303 F.3d at 695. 
 29. Press Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 464 U.S. 501, 513-14 (1984). 
 30. Press Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 478 U.S. 1, 10 (1986). 
 31. For a recent review of representative cases see Detroit Free Press, 303 F.3d at 695. 
 32. Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 585. 
 33. See, e.g., Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1978); Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 
817, 834-35 (1974); Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417 U.S. 843, 849-50 (1974). 
 34. Houchins, 438 U.S. at 15-16; Pell, 417 U.S. at 834-35; Saxbe, 417 U.S. at 849-50. 
 35. Pell, 417 U.S. at 819; Saxbe, 417 U.S. at 844. 
 36. Houchins, 438 U.S. at 3. 
 37. Houchins, 438 U.S. at 15-16; Pell, 417 U.S. at 834-35; Saxbe, 417 U.S. at 850. 
 38. See, cases cited supra note 37. 
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the public, have traditionally been excluded.39  These examples include “grand 
jury proceedings,” Supreme Court conferences, “meetings of other official 
bodies gathered in executive session,” “meetings of private organizations,” and 
“scenes of crime or disaster.”40 
The Supreme Court confirmed this limited view of access rights as recently 
as 1999.41  In Los Angeles Police Department v. United Reporting Publishing 
Corp.,42 the Court rejected a First Amendment challenge to a California law 
denying access to the addresses of arrestees when sought to sell a product or 
service.43  The Court noted that, because the case involved “nothing more than 
a governmental denial of access to information in its possession,” the State 
could have gone even further and decided “not to give out arrestee information 
at all without violating the First Amendment.”44  Even Justices Stevens and 
Kennedy, who dissented because they felt the law was an improper violation of 
commercial speech rights, acknowledged that denying access to arrestee 
addresses would not have violated the First Amendment.45 
Judicial Hints of a Right of Access in Cases Addressing Other First 
Amendment Rights 
In general, the above cases illustrate that, outside of judicial proceedings, 
the Court has been reluctant to compel the government to disclose information 
on the theory that the public had a First Amendment right to access it.  
However, in cases dealing with other First Amendment rights, the Court has, at 
times, suggested that the right of access deserves constitutional protection.46  
For example, when addressing a Michigan obscenity law banning materials 
tending to corrupt “the morals of youth,” the Court ruled that the law was 
unconstitutionally overbroad, because it limited “the adult population of 
Michigan to reading only what is fit for children.”47  When reviewing a 
Georgia law prohibiting the possession of obscene materials, the Court 
declared it is “well established that the Constitution protects the right to 
receive information and ideas.”48  In the same case, the Court also declared, 
“[i]f the First Amendment means anything, it means that a State has no 
 
 39. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 684-85 (1972). 
 40. Id. 
 41. Los Angeles Police Dep’t v. United Reporting Publ’g Corp., 528 U.S. 32, 34 (1999). 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. at 40. 
 45. Id. at 45 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Kennedy joined in Justice Steven’s dissent.  Id. 
at 44. 
 46. See, e.g., Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380, 384 (1957). 
 47. Id. at 383. 
 48. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
10 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY PUBLIC LAW REVIEW [Vol. 25:3 
business telling a man, sitting alone in his own house, what books he may read 
or what films he may watch.”49 
The same year, the Supreme Court upheld a portion of the FCC’s fairness 
doctrine requiring broadcasters to provide a right of reply to a person 
disparaged during the broadcast of a controversial issue.50  In upholding the 
regulation, the Court acknowledged that the public has a right to “suitable 
access to social, political, esthetic, moral and other ideas and experiences.”51  
The Court stressed that the First Amendment protects “an uninhibited 
marketplace of ideas in which truth will ultimately prevail, rather than to 
countenance monopolization of that market, whether it be by the Government 
itself or a private licensee.”52 
Recently, the right of access to information arose in United States v. 
American Library Association.53  In that case, the Court upheld the 
constitutionality of the Children’s Internet Protection Act (“CIPA”), which 
requires libraries to install internet filtering software on computers as a 
condition to receiving certain federal grants.54  Citing Stanley v. Georgia, 
Justice Breyer indicated in his concurring opinion that the right to receive 
information is protected by the First Amendment.55  Therefore, he asserted that 
the constitutionality of CIPA should have been tested with more exacting 
scrutiny than the “rational basis” test used by the plurality, specifically because 
it “restricts the public’s receipt of information.”56  Similarly, Justice Souter, 
with whom Justice Ginsburg joined in dissent, argued that strict scrutiny 
should have been used to test the constitutionality of CIPA because of the 
potential for internet filters to violate an adult patron’s First Amendment right 
to access material of their choosing.57 
Cases Affirming a General First Amendment Right of Access 
Although none of the cases in which the Court recognized a right to 
information dealt with compelling the government to disclose government 
information or activities, the cases did establish there is at least some 
protection for the right of individuals to “receive information and ideas,”58 
 
 49. Id. at 565. 
 50. Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969). 
 51. Id. at 390. 
 52. Id. 
 53. 539 U.S. 194, 214 (2003). 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. at 216 (Breyer, J., concurring) (citing Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969)). 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. at 242-43 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
 58. Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 762 (1972); see also, Richmond Newspapers, Inc. 
v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 576 (1980). 
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particularly from each other.59  This includes the right to receive corporate 
political communications,60 advertising,61 labor union communications,62 
door-to-door solicitations,63 and postal mail without having to take the 
affirmative step of requesting it.64  This right to information is based on the 
premise that “the First Amendment goes beyond protection of the press and the 
self-expression of individuals to prohibit government from limiting the stock 
of information from which members of the public may draw.”65 
In addition to the Supreme Court, some lower courts have recognized that 
the First Amendment protects public access to information.66  For example, 
federal courts have ruled that statutes prohibiting exit interviews of voters near 
polling places violated the media’s right to gather information.67  Similarly, 
courts have held that the First Amendment bars the police from unduly 
interfering with the media’s newsgathering activities.68  Courts have even ruled 
that the government can be compelled to release records pursuant to citizens’ 
right of access to public records that is both rooted in the common law and 
protected by the First Amendment.69  In Richmond Newspapers the Supreme 
Court also recognized that the right to attend trials was rooted in the common 
law.70 
In all, one could argue that recognition of a public right of access has been 
gaining ground in the United States,71 and that the dissents of Stevens, 
Brennan, and Powell in Houchins were validated by the Supreme Court in 
 
 59. See, e.g., Grosjean v. Am. Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 249-50 (1936) (discussing the right 
of members of society to share information regarding their common interests). 
 60. First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 794-95 (1978). 
 61. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748 
(1976). 
 62. Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516 (1945). 
 63. Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943). 
 64. Lamont v. Postmaster Gen., 381 U.S. 301 (1965). 
 65. First Nat’l Bank of Boston, 435 U.S. at 783. 
 66. See, e.g., Daily Herald v. Munro, 838 F.2d 380 (9th Cir. 1988) (invalidating a state law 
that prohibited exit interviews within 300 feet of polling places); see also, CBS Inc. v. Smith, 681 
F. Supp. 794, 806 (S.D. Fla. 1988) (invalidating 150 foot restriction on such interviews). 
 67. Daily Herald, 838 F.2d at 389; CBS, 681 F. Supp. at 806. 
 68. See, e.g., Fordyce v. City of Seattle, 55 F.3d 436, 438-40 (9th Cir. 1995); Connell v. 
Town of Hudson, 733 F. Supp. 465, 469-471 (D.N.H. 1990); see also, Barry P. McDonald, The 
First Amendment and the Free Flow of Information: Towards a Realistic Right to Gather 
Information in the Information Age, 65 OHIO ST. L.J. 249 (2004) (providing an excellent review 
of cases relevant to the right to gather information). 
 69. Providence Journal Co. v. McCoy, 94 F. Supp. 186, 195-96 (D.R.I. 1950) (ruling that the 
state could not withhold information regarding tax cancellations and abatements). 
 70. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 564-75 (1980). 
 71. For an interesting discussion of the growth of the “right to know” movement in the U.S. 
see Pack, supra note 3, at 816-17. 
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Richmond Newspapers.72  The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals expressed this 
perception when it ruled that the Bush administration’s practice of closing 
deportation hearings violated the First Amendment.73  The Sixth Circuit court 
asserted that “it is clear that the Court has since moved away from its position 
in Houchins and recognizes that there is a limited constitutional right to some 
government information.”74 
However, until the Supreme Court specifically extends the rationale of 
Richmond Newspapers and its progeny beyond judicially related contexts, the 
extent of the First Amendment right of access to information will be contested.  
The fact that the Court only addressed the issue squarely in Richmond 
Newspapers and its progeny has left scholars to interpret the extent of the right 
by looking to disparate decisions, rendered in an array of unrelated cases, that 
provide little guidance on the precise extent of the right.75  In fact, when it 
comes to the question of requiring the government to take affirmative steps to 
assure access to government activities or information, two former Supreme 
Court Justices intimated that it is up to the political process (e.g., Congress) 
rather than the Constitution, to determine what information the public can 
obtain and the conditions under which it can be obtained.76 
LEGISLATION: FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT (FOIA) 
The public’s right of access to government information has been addressed 
in the political process.  Congress and all state legislatures have passed open 
meeting and/or open record laws that require varying degrees of government 
openness and transparency.77 
At the federal level, the Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”)78 has been 
the most comprehensive legislation guaranteeing public access to government 
records.79  FOIA, enacted in 1966 (and amended various times over the 
 
 72. See Papandrea, supra note 3 at 41-44 for a discussion of these dissents that evidences 
their consistency with the Richmond Newspapers decision. 
 73. Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft, 303 F.3d 681, 695 (6th Cir. 2002). 
 74. Id. 
 75. Richmond Newspapers, Inc., 448 U.S. at 580-81. 
 76. See Houchins v. KQED, 438 U.S. 1, 12 (1978) (Chief Justice Warren Burger asserted in 
his majority opinion that determining whether a penal institution should be open was “clearly a 
legislative task that the Constitution has left to the political processes.”); see also, Potter Stewart, 
Or of the Press, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 631, 636 (1975) (Justice Stewart stated that “the public’s 
interest in knowing about its government is protected by the guarantee of a Free Press, but the 
protection is indirect. . . .  The Constitution, in other words, establishes the contest, not its 
resolution. Congress may provide the resolution . . . through carefully drawn legislation”). 
 77. For a general overview of access to records and open meeting laws, see KENT R. 
MIDDLETON, ET AL., THE LAW OF PUBLIC COMMUNICATION 474-513 (1997). 
 78. Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2000), amended by Pub. L. No. 107-306, 
110 Stat. 3048 (2003). 
 79. Id. 
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years),80 permits “any person” to obtain information in the possession of a 
federal agency regardless of the requester’s reasons for requesting the records 
or what they intend to do with the information obtained.81  Accordingly, FOIA 
provides a presumption of access.82  If a federal agency feels that records in its 
possession are not subject to disclosure, the burden is on the government to 
show that the information should not be divulged.83 
FOIA provides nine exemptions that permit a federal agency to withhold 
information under specific circumstances.84  Information exempt from 
disclosure includes (1) information classified in the interest of protecting 
“national defense or foreign policy,” (2) information pertaining to an agency’s 
personnel rules and practices, (3) information protected from disclosure 
pursuant to another statute, (4) privileged or confidential “trade secrets and 
commercial and financial information,” (5) information not available by law to 
a party “other than an agency in litigation with the agency,” (6) personnel, 
medical, and similar files that would constitute an invasion of personal privacy 
if disclosed, (7) records maintained for law enforcement reasons, (8) 
information pertaining to financial institution supervision or regulation, and (9) 
geological and geophysical information pertaining to wells.85 
FOIA’s presumption of public access to government records, subject only 
to these enumerated exemptions, has generated significant litigation in which 
courts have had to interpret whether the exemption(s) being relied on by the 
government justified denial of access.86  Executive branch secrecy during the 
War on Terrorism has stimulated some of this litigation.87 
GOVERNMENT SECRECY AND INFORMATION ACCESS IN THE WAR ON 
TERRORISM 
In Houchins, the Supreme Court suggested that the First Amendment does 
not require that the government provide access to its facilities, activities, and 
records.88  However, that suggestion has never been the uniform position of all 
Justices.  In cases decided both before and after Houchins, the Supreme Court 
 
 80. For a brief review of significant amendments, see DWIGHT L. TEETER ET AL., LAW OF 
MASS COMMUNICATIONS: FREEDOM AND CONTROL OF PRINT AND BROADCAST MEDIA 437-40 
(1989). 
 81. § 552(a)(3); see also Papandrea, supra note 3, at 50. 
 82. § 552(a)(3). 
 83. § 552(a)(4)(B). 
 84. § 552(b). 
 85. § 552(b). 
 86. For recent cases see The Department of Justice, Freedom of Information Case List, May 
2002, www.usdoj.gov/04foia/cl-tofc.html (last visited Jan. 15, 2006). 
 87. See, e.g., Ctr. for Nat’l Sec. Studies v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 331 F.3d 918, 932 (D.C. Cir 
2003); Am. Civil Liberties Union v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 265 F. Supp. 2d 20, 21 (D.D.C. 2003). 
 88. See Houchins v. KQED, 438 U.S. 1, 4 (1978). 
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and lower courts recognized at least some degree of constitutional protection of 
the public’s access rights.89  Congress has also opened the doors to government 
through legislation such as FOIA and the Sunshine Act,90 which require access 
to government records and meetings, respectively.  Most state legislatures have 
passed similar legislation creating a presumption of openness to government 
records and meetings.91 
However, the War on Terrorism presents new challenges to increased 
openness and has stimulated debate about the extent of the right of the public 
to receive information about government activities related to the war.  Wars 
tend to heighten the tension between citizens’ desire for information about the 
government’s wartime activities and the government’s desire to control access 
in order to protect national security. 
Assuming arguendo that the First Amendment does protect a “right of 
access” to information, like other First Amendment rights, the right is not 
absolute.  It can be outweighed by more salient countervailing government 
interests.  National security is one significant and broad government interest 
that has been used extensively by the Bush administration during the War on 
Terrorism to deny the public access to information concerning its wartime 
activities.92 
Judicial confusion regarding the right of access to information reflected in 
the above cases, coupled with the reluctance of courts to compel disclosure of 
information that allegedly could harm national security, has been apparent 
during the War on Terrorism.  Below, I will discuss a few poignant examples 
that have generated the most attention in the last few years. 
FOIA during the War on Terrorism 
The strain between public FOIA rights and government initiatives taken in 
the War on Terrorism has been the subject of wide discussion.93  One 
overarching issue has been the Bush administration’s apparent proclivity to 
hide its activities from public view.94 
For example, in October 2001, Attorney General Ashcroft directed 
agencies to exercise a more restrictive interpretation of FOIA requests than that 
 
 89. See e.g., Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 580 (1980); Providence 
Journal Co. v. McCoy, 94 F. Supp. 186, 196 (D.R.I. 1950). 
 90. See MIDDLETON ET AL., supra note 77, at 513 (discussing the Sunshine Act of 1976, 
which requires federal agencies to conduct open meetings). 
 91. Id. 
 92. Papandrea, supra note 3, at 35. 
 93. See, e.g., Anderson, supra note 3, at 1605; McDermott, supra note 3, at 671; O’Reilly, 
supra note 3, at 809; Steinzor, supra note 3, at 642-43; Wells, supra note 3, at 451-52. 
 94. See Papandrea, supra note 3, at 35. 
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taken during the Clinton administration.95  Whereas the Clinton administration 
interpreted FOIA to facilitate public access to documents, the Bush 
administration’s approach arguably impedes access by pledging Department of 
Justice support of non-disclosure decisions (provided there is a “sound legal 
basis” for them) and encouraging use of FOIA exemptions.96 
Shortly after the Attorney General’s October 2001 directive, Andrew Card, 
the President’s Chief of Staff, directed federal agencies to interpret FOIA 
exemptions carefully and to withhold not only classified documents, but also 
sensitive information even if it was unclassified and not specifically exempted 
under FOIA.97  He also directed agencies to review their records to insure that 
information in their control was properly classified.98 
The President also has acted to reduce the amount of government 
information available to the public.99  As referenced above, FOIA exempts 
from disclosure information classified pursuant to an Executive Order for the 
preservation of national security.100  On March 25, 2003, President Bush 
increased the scope of material subject to this exemption by issuing Executive 
Order 13,292.101  The order encourages the classification of information in the 
hands of federal agencies and the reclassification of information that had 
previously been released.102 
Congress has supported the executive branch’s efforts toward secrecy.  For 
example, the Homeland Security Act,103 passed at the President’s urging, 
specifically directs the President to “safeguard homeland security information 
that is sensitive but unclassified.”104  Congress also passed the Critical 
Information Infrastructure Act (“CIIA”).105  The CIIA encourages private 
sector entities (e.g., corporations) to share information with the government by 
providing them with immunity from civil liability in return for submitting 
 
 95. Memorandum from Attorney General John Ashcroft for Heads of all Federal 
Departments and Agencies (October 12, 2001) available at www.usdoj.gov/04foia/011012.htm 
(last visited Jan. 15, 2006). 
 96. Id. 
 97. Memorandum from Andrew Card Jr., assistant to the President and Chief of Staff, for 
Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies (March 19, 2002), available at www.usdoj.gov/ 
oip/foiapost/2002foiapost10.htm (last visited Jan 15, 2006). 
 98. Id. 
 99. See, e.g., Exec Order No. 13,292, 68 Fed. Reg. 15315 (Mar. 25, 2003). 
 100. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1) (2005). 
 101. Exec Order No. 13,292, 68 Fed. Reg. 15315 (Mar. 25, 2003). 
 102. Id. 
 103. Homeland Security Act, Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135 (2002) (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 6 U.S.C.). 
 104. 6 U.S.C. § 482(a)(1)(B) (2005). 
 105. The CIIA is part of the Homeland Security Act.  See, e.g., Homeland Security Act, Pub. 
L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135 (2002) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 6 U.S.C.). 
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critical infrastructure information to the government.106  Critical infrastructure 
information is “information not customarily in the public domain and related to 
the security of critical infrastructure or protected systems.”107 
An important provision of the Act provides that critical infrastructure 
information submitted to the government “shall be exempt from disclosure” 
under FOIA,108 and “shall not . . . be used or disclosed by any officer or 
employee of the United States.”109  The Department of Justice has taken the 
position that information voluntarily submitted to the Department of Homeland 
Security pursuant to the CIIA is exempt from disclosure under section 
552(b)(3) of FOIA.110 
In addition to congressional support for the President’s restrictive FOIA 
approach, there has been significant judicial support as well.111  The first major 
case in which FOIA was used in an attempt to force the executive branch to 
disclose information during the war on terrorism was Center for National 
Security Studies v. U.S. Department of Justice.112  The case arose when several 
public interest groups sought to compel the government to release information 
regarding the number of people detained in the War on Terrorism, their 
identities, the identities of their lawyers, the reasons for detainment, and where 
detainees were being held.113  The Department of Justice argued that FOIA 
exemptions 7(A), (C), and (F) justified withholding the information.114  
Despite agreeing that FOIA did not exempt the bulk of the material sought, the 
district court specifically rejected the plaintiffs’ argument that they were 
entitled to the information pursuant to the First Amendment and common law 
right of access to public records.115 
The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the district court’s order 
rejecting the government’s claim that the material was exempt.116  The D.C. 
Circuit Court of Appeals held that the current threat of terrorism warranted the 
exercise of judicial deference to the judgment of the executive branch in light 
 
 106. Public Citizen, FOIA and Homeland Security Issues, http://www.citizen.org/litigation/ 
free_info/foic_lr/otherstatues/index.cfm. 
 107. 6 U.S.C. § 131(3) 
 108. § 133(a)(1)(A). 
 109. § 133(a)(1)(D). 
 110. U.S. Department of Justice Office of Information and Privacy, Homeland Security Law 
Contains New Exemption 3 Statute, available at http://www.usdoj.gov/oip/foiapost/ 
2003foiapost4.htm. 
 111. See generally Ctr. for Nat’l Sec. Studies v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 215 F. Supp. 2d 94 
(D.D.C. 2002). 
 112. Id. at 94. 
 113. Id. at 97. 
 114. Id. at 100. The exemptions are codified at 5 U.S.C. §552(b)(7)(A), (C) & (F) (2005). 
 115. Ctr. for Nat’l Sec. Studies, 215 F. Supp. 2d at 111-12. 
 116. Ctr. for Nat’l Sec. Studies v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 331 F.3d 918, 937 (D.C. Cir. 2003). 
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of national security implications.117  Requiring little proof of actual national 
security dangers of disclosure, the appellate court stated that the government’s 
counterterrorism officials were in the best position to make this predictive 
judgment.118 
Like the district court, the circuit court also rejected the argument that the 
First Amendment required disclosure.119  The court applied a very narrow 
reading of the right of access, specifically stating that “[t]he narrow First 
Amendment right of access to information recognized in Richmond 
Newspapers does not extend to non-judicial documents that are not part of a 
criminal trial.”120  Therefore, according to the court, the First Amendment was 
not even “implicated by the executive’s refusal to disclose the identities of the 
detainees and information concerning their detention.”121 
In a dissenting opinion, Judge Tatel lamented that “the court’s uncritical 
deference to the government’s vague, poorly explained arguments for 
withholding broad categories of information about the detainees, as well as its 
willingness to fill in the factual and logical gaps in the government’s case, 
eviscerates both FOIA itself and the principles of openness in government that 
FOIA embodies.”122  Hinting at greater sensitivity for the plaintiff’s First 
Amendment argument than that exhibited by the majority, Judge Tatel stated 
that: 
[a]lthough this court overlooks it, there is another compelling interest at stake 
in this case: the public’s interest in knowing whether the government, in 
responding to the attacks, is violating the constitutional rights of the hundreds 
of persons whom it has detained in connection with its terrorism 
investigation . . . .  Just as the government has a compelling interest in ensuring 
citizens’ safety, so do citizens have a compelling interest in ensuring that their 
government does not, in discharging its duties, abuse one of its most awesome 
powers, the power to arrest and jail.123 
Thus, like numerous prior right of access cases, the circuit court’s opinion 
was not unanimous.124  The judges disagreed on the extent to which the public 
had a right to know what its government was doing.125 
Another important post-9/11 FOIA case implicating public access rights 
dealt with the government’s refusal to release information regarding its 
 
 117. Id. at 926-27. 
 118. Id. at 928. 
 119. Id. at 935. 
 120. Id. at 934. 
 121. Ctr. for Nat’l Sec. Studies., 331 F.3d at 935. 
 122. Id. at 937 (Tatel, J., dissenting). 
 123. Id. at 937-38 (Tatel, J., dissenting). 
 124. Id. at 937 (Tatel, J., dissenting). 
 125. Id. 
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surveillance activities enhanced by the U.S.A. PATRIOT Act.126  In American 
Civil Liberties Union v. U.S. Department of Justice,127 the ACLU and other 
civil liberties groups sought, in part, “records containing aggregate statistical 
information revealing how often DOJ had used the Act’s new surveillance and 
search provisions: roving surveillance under section 206; pen registers/trap and 
trace devices under section 214; demands for production of tangible things 
under section 215; and sneak and peek warrants under section 213.”128  The 
Justice Department argued that the information was exempt from disclosure 
primarily pursuant to FOIA’s national security exemption because the 
information could aid terrorists and harm national security.129 
At least acknowledging a public right of access, the district court judge 
noted that “it must be recognized that FOIA represents a carefully considered 
balance between the right of the public to know what their government is up to 
and the often compelling interest that the government maintains in keeping 
certain information private, whether to protect particular individuals or the 
national interest as a whole.”130  However, relying on affidavits from 
government officials, the judge granted the government’s motion for summary 
judgment, stressing that although the “plaintiffs’ arguments in favor of 
disclosure are not without force, they are ultimately insufficient to overcome 
the agency’s expert judgment that withholding the disputed information is 
authorized . . . because it is reasonably connected to the protection of national 
security.”131 
In short, in two of the most important post-9/11 FOIA challenges to 
government non-disclosure, federal courts granted the executive branch 
significant latitude to determine for itself what information should be made 
public. 
Deportation Hearings and Military Trials During the War on Terrorism 
In addition to FOIA matters, the Bush administration’s practice of 
controlling the disclosure of information has been reflected in the 
administration’s handling of deportation hearings and its authorization to 
establish military tribunals to try alleged foreign terrorists captured by the 
United States.  Although there are a host of legal issues implicated by these 
initiatives, the fact that the executive branch has authorized the closure of each 
of these types of proceedings is the most relevant issue. 
 
 126. Am. Civil Liberties Union v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 265 F. Supp. 2d 20, 21 (D.D.C. 
2003). 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. at 25. 
 129. Id. at 21. The exemption is codified at 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1). 
 130. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 265 F. Supp. 2d at 27. 
 131. Id. at 30. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2006] CITIZEN ACCESS AND GOVERNMENT SECRECY 19 
Deportation Hearings.  On September 21, 2001, Chief Immigration Judge 
Michael Creppy instructed immigration judges to close deportation hearings 
designated as “special interest” proceedings.132  The media quickly challenged 
the practice of conducting these hearings in secrecy.133  Unfortunately, the two 
federal appellate courts that heard the challenges to the practice disagreed 
about whether the hearings could be closed.134 
In Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled 
that closing deportation hearings violated the First Amendment rights of the 
press and public.135  In North Jersey Media Group v. Ashcroft, the Third 
Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that closure was justified, based on the 
government’s assertion that national security mandated closure.136 
Both courts relied upon the Supreme Court’s “experience and logic” 
rationale elaborated in Richmond Newspapers and its progeny.137  However, 
whereas the Sixth Circuit felt there was a tradition of open deportation 
hearings, the Third Circuit disagreed, citing examples of instances when 
hearings may not be conducted in places open to the public (e.g., private 
homes or prisons).138  In addition, the Sixth Circuit felt that openness enhanced 
the structural value of the process by ensuring that the hearings were 
conducted properly and informed the public.139  The Third Circuit court, 
however, felt that the “flip side” had to be considered: the potential negative 
effects of openness on national security.140  Ultimately, a divided Third Circuit 
decided that the risk to national security outweighed the benefits that openness 
might provide.141 
Military Tribunals.  Unlike post-9/11 deportation hearings, military trials 
of alleged terrorists have been authorized by the President, but not yet 
 
 132. See North Jersey Media Group v. Ashcroft, 308 F.3d 198, 202-03 (3rd Cir. 2002) 
(discussing Judge Creppy’s directive). Special interest proceedings include those involving 
persons who “might have connections with, or possess information pertaining to, terrorist 
activities against the United States.”  Id. at 202 (citing a declaration of Dale L. Watson, Executive 
Assistant Director for Counterterrorism and Counterintelligence). 
 133. Id. at 203-04. 
 134. Id. at 221; Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft, 303 F.3d 681, 700 (6th Cir. 2002). 
 135. Detroit Free Press, 303 F.3d at 700. 
 136. 308 F.3d at 221. 
 137. Id. at 204-05; Detroit Free Press, 303 F.3d at 684-85. 
 138. Compare Detroit Free Press, 303 F.3d at 701, with North Jersey Media Group, 308 F.3d 
at 212. 
 139. See Detroit Free Press, 303 F.3d at 703-05 (identifying several values served by public 
access to immigration hearings, including: serving a check on the executive branch, ensuring that 
the government did its job properly, serving as a catharsis for the public, enhancing a perception 
of fairness, and providing information about public affairs). 
 140. North Jersey Media Group, 308 F.3d at 217. 
 141. Id. 
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conducted.142  Like deportation hearings, the executive branch has asserted the 
authority to close them in the interest of national security.143  President Bush 
issued the order authorizing military tribunals on November 13, 2001.144  The 
order empowered the Department of Defense to issue rules and regulations that 
would govern the military proceedings.145  Shortly thereafter, the Department 
of Defense issued a military order setting forth parameters for the military 
commission proceedings.146  Section 6B(3) of the Department of Defense 
Order provides that proceedings can be closed to protect classified or 
classifiable information, information protected from disclosure by rule or law, 
the safety of trial participants, intelligence and law enforcement sources, and 
national security interests.147 
Although military trials of alleged terrorists have not yet been conducted, 
the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals recently cleared the way for the trials to 
proceed.148  In Hamdan v. Rumsfeld,149 the D.C. Circuit ruled that alleged al 
Qaeda terrorists designated by the Pentagon as “enemy combatants” are not 
prisoners of war covered by the Geneva Convention of 1949 and can be tried 
before the President’s military commissions.150  The court also ruled that 
Congress properly authorized use of the tribunals,151 and found that Supreme 
Court precedent upheld the use of such tribunals during World War II.152 
One aspect of those World War II military trials the Hamdan court did not 
reference is the fact that they were closed proceedings.153  However, they 
occurred long before the Supreme Court’s Richmond Newspapers decision.154  
The application of the Richmond Newspapers experience and logic rationale by 
the Sixth and Third Circuit Courts of Appeal when assessing the First 
Amendment right of access to “special interest” deportation hearings suggest it 
 
 142. See Military Order: Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War 
Against Terrorism, 66 Fed. Reg. 57,833 (Nov. 13, 2001). 
 143. Id. at 57,835. 
 144. Id. at 57,833. 
 145. Id at 57,834. 
 146. Department of Defense Military Commission Order No. 1 (March 21, 2002), available at 
www.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/dod/dod032102milcomord1.pdf. 
 147. Id. 
 148. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 415 F.3d 33, 40-41 (D.C. Cir. 2005). 
 149. Id. 
 150. Id. 
 151. See e.g., Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 
(2001); see also, 10 U.S.C § 821 and § 836, (cited as authority in the President’s Military Order). 
 152. See In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 9 (1946); Ex parte Quirin v. Cox, 317 U.S. 1, 20-21 
(1942). 
 153. For a brief description of the closed proceedings of the Ex parte Quirin defendants, see 
Papandrea, supra note 3, at 76-78. 
 154. Compare In re Yamashita, 317 U.S. at 1 (decided in 1946) and Ex parte Quirin, 317 
U.S. at 1 (decided in 1942), with Richmond Newspapers v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980) 
(decided in 1980). 
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is relevant to proceedings implemented during the War on Terrorism.155  The 
Richmond Newspapers rationale also has been found applicable to military 
proceedings.156  Since 1985, the Court of Military Appeals has maintained a 
presumption that military court martial proceedings must be open.157  The fact 
that the President drew on the Code of Military Justice when authorizing the 
use of military tribunals in the War on Terrorism arguably assumes the 
applicability of this presumption of openness.158  However, the President also 
asserted the authority to close these tribunals.159 
Because the President’s military tribunals, like those conducted during and 
in the aftermath of World War II, are subject to closure by the executive 
branch, closure of one or more of the tribunals in the interest of national 
security could trigger a debate between government secrecy and public access 
rights that is unique to wartime (the military trials of enemy combatants) and 
has never been addressed by the Supreme Court.160  In addition, because 
military tribunals are forums that are very similar to civilian trials, which the 
Supreme Court has indicated must be open, their closure, like FOIA disputes 
and closed deportation hearings, would represent an important front in the 
tension between openness and government secrecy in the War on Terrorism.161 
Some Additional Examples of Government Suppression of Information 
The Bush administration’s efforts to control disclosure of information in 
FOIA matters, deportation hearings, and military trials of terrorists are 
examples of initiatives implemented during the War on Terrorism that 
arguably affect the public’s access to information.  Although too numerous to 
detail here, it is worthwhile to reference a few additional initiatives aimed at 
controlling public access and government transparency.162 
 
 155. See supra notes 136-142 and accompanying text. 
 156. United States v. Hershey, 20 M.J. 433, 436 (C.M.A. 1985). 
 157. Id. at 435. 
 158. See Military Order: Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War 
Against Terrorism, 66 Fed. Reg. 57,833 (Nov. 13, 2001).  The President cited 10 U.S.C. 821 and 
10 U.S.C. 836 (Articles 21 and 36 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice)). 
 159. Military Order: Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War 
Against Terrorism, 66 Fed. Reg. 57,833, 57,835 (Nov. 13, 2001). 
 160. See generally Paul Haridakis, The War on Terrorism: Military Trials and the First 
Amendment, 9 COMM. L. & POL’Y 317 (2004) (discussing military trials and a right of access). 
 161. Id.  
 162. For a more comprehensive list and examination of examples in which the executive 
branch has withheld information from the public and Congress, see Minority Staff Special 
Investigations Division, United States House of Representatives Committee on Government 
Reform, Secrecy in the Bush Administration, (prepared for Rep. Henry A. Waxman), available at 
http://democrats.reform.house.gov/features/secrecy_report/index.asp (hereinafter Minority Staff 
Investigations Division). 
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Congressional Action.  Although the Bush administration has received 
substantial criticism for dissuading disclosure of information, the 
administration often has been acting pursuant to the authority granted to it by 
Congress.163  Section 215 of the U.S.A. PATRIOT Act and the CIIA (included 
as part of the Homeland Security Act) are two particularly noteworthy tools 
Congress has given the executive branch that specifically mandate 
nondisclosure of government activity.164 
Section 215 of the U.S.A. PATRIOT Act165 enhanced and expanded the 
ability of the government to obtain records regarding individuals’ educational, 
library, banking, and medical records from institutions that retain them.166  
Section 215 cultivates government secrecy, in effect, by imposing a statutory 
gag rule on the institutions from which such records are obtained.167  
Specifically, if records are sought or obtained by the FBI, the institutions from 
which the records are sought or obtained are prohibited from disclosing the 
FBI’s inquiry.168 
The CIIA imposes a similar de facto gag rule.169  As referenced above, the 
CIIA was passed as part of the Homeland Security Act.170  It encourages 
private entities to turn critical infrastructure information over to the 
Department of Homeland Security.171  The Act gags government employees by 
providing that those who disclose critical infrastructure information provided 
by corporations “shall be fined under title 18 of the United States Code, 
imprisoned not more than 1 year, or both, and shall be removed from office or 
employment.”172 
Executive Branch Action.  Although Congress has, to some extent, 
supported governmental suppression of information during the War on 
terrorism, the exercise of suppression has most often been carried out by the 
 
 163. See 6 U.S.C. § 133 (2005); 50 U.S.C. § 1861 (2004). 
 164. 6 U.S.C. § 133; 50 U.S.C. § 1861. 
 165. 50 U.S.C. § 1861. 
 166. For comprehensive discussions of Section 215, which expanded the entities from which 
the FBI could obtain records and lessened the burden for obtaining an order for records under the 
Foreign Surveillance Act, see Katherine K. Coolidge, “Baseless Hysteria:” The Controversy 
Between the Department of Justice and the American Library Association over the USA 
PATRIOT Act, 97 LAW LIBR. J. 7 (2005); Anne Klinefelter, The Role of Librarians in Challenges 
to the USA PATRIOT Act, 5 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 219 (2004); Susan Nevelow Mart, Protecting the 
Lady from Toledo: Post-USA PATRIOT Act Electronic Surveillance at the Library, 96 LAW LIBR. 
J. 449 (2004); Michael J. O’Donnell, Reading for Terrorism: Section 215 of the USA PATRIOT 
Act and the Constitutional Right to Information Privacy, 31 J. LEGIS. 45 (2004). 
 167. See 50 U.S.C. § 1861(d). 
 168. Id. 
 169. See 6 U.S.C. § 133(f). 
 170. See supra note 104 and accompanying text. 
 171. 6 U.S.C. § 133. 
 172. 6 U.S.C. § 133(f). 
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executive branch.173  In addition to closing deportation hearings, authorizing 
closed military tribunals, and broadly interpreting FOIA exemptions, the Bush 
administration has taken great pains to cloak other activities in secrecy.174 
A significant mechanism has been an expansive interpretation and use of 
legal privileges, including executive privilege.175  For example, when Congress 
requested information regarding activities of Vice President Cheney’s energy 
task force, which he impaneled in his capacity as the President’s head of 
national energy policy, the executive branch claimed the information sought 
was privileged from disclosure.176  When records of former President Ronald 
Reagan were due to be released and made available to the public pursuant to 
the Presidential Records Act of 1978,177 President Bush invoked executive 
privilege to restrict disclosure of presidential records to which the public would 
otherwise have access.178  Specifically, he issued Executive Order 13,233179 to 
eliminate a presumption of disclosure and expand the scope of the records that 
could be delayed from disclosure.180  The Executive Order also extended such 
protection to the Vice President.181 
In July 2005, the President nominated John Roberts, one of the circuit 
court judges who ruled in Hamdan that the President’s military trials could 
proceed, to fill the vacancy on the United States Supreme Court created when 
Sandra Day O’Connor resigned.182  When Congress asked the White House to 
turn over documents regarding Justice Robert’s advice during his tenure in the 
administrations of former Presidents Ronald Reagan and George H. W. Bush, 
the administration invoked the attorney-client and attorney work product 
privileges to withhold documents from disclosure.183  The administration took 
a similar approach in the face of congressional requests for documents 
pertaining to the work product of recently appointed UN Ambassador, John 
Bolton.184 
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The executive branch has been particularly fervent in concealing 
information pertaining to individuals detained during the War on Terrorism.185  
In addition to providing that military trials of detainees could be closed, the 
Pentagon has been secretive about the tribunals and potential defendants.186  
The executive branch zealously fought the release of information about 
detainees in the face of a FOIA request.187  In addition, it allegedly has 
withheld information from Congress, restricted press access to Guantanamo 
Bay, Cuba, required journalists visiting the prison to sign contracts agreeing 
not to speak to detainees, and ordered secret detentions of prisoners captured 
during the war in Iraq.188 
Judicial Branch.  It is at least worth mentioning that the judicial branch 
bears some responsibility for the government’s non-disclosure of information 
to the public.189  Judicial branch acquiescence to government secrecy has come 
in the form of opinions in which courts exercised significant deference to 
executive branch actions.190  Dissents penned in these cases indicate that even 
some jurists are troubled by the uncritical acceptance of government reasons 
for withholding information from the public.  When the media appealed the 
Third Circuit’s decision in North Jersey, the United States Supreme Court 
declined to hear the appeal, leaving a significant split between the circuits 
regarding whether the First Amendment rights of access apply in deportation 
hearings.191 
THE RIGHT OF ACCESS AND SECRECY IN THE WAR ON TERRORISM 
The above discussion was intended to provide some illustrative recent 
examples of the government’s efforts to withhold disclosure of certain 
activities from the public.  Most Americans undoubtedly recognize such 
practices are, at times, in the public interest.192  However, public access to 
information regarding the activities of the government, which, ostensibly, are 
exercised on behalf of the people, is fundamental to the U.S. democratic 
principle of self-governance.193  As stated earlier, the people may not rule in a 
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practical sense, but “they do judge those who do.”194  Accordingly, 
government efforts at controlling public access, such as those exercised by the 
government during the War on Terrorism must be scrutinized closely, as such 
secrecy limits the information in the public domain, which is necessary for 
maintaining the integrity and accountability of government bodies. 
Although it strains credulity to argue that citizen consent and self-
governance can be achieved if information necessary to give consent and 
engage in self-governance is withheld, the extent to which the Constitution 
protects the public’s access rights is still being contested.195  In several cases, 
the Supreme Court has noted the importance of access to our democracy, and 
several individual justices have supported the argument that access is 
constitutionally protected.196  What has escaped resolution and consensus, 
though, is the extent of that protection.197 
There is little dispute that both Congress and the executive branch have 
taken actions during the War on Terrorism that has limited the amount of 
information available to the public about the federal government’s wartime 
activities.  However, it is difficult to assess whether those actions have violated 
the public’s First Amendment right of access, because prior case law suggests 
that the extent of a right of access is contingent on the setting and type of 
information involved.198  Generally, the right of access has been afforded the 
most protection in judicial settings where the Supreme Court has indicated that 
the right to attend trials is protected.199  Courts also have afforded significant 
protection for a right of access in cases involving willing speakers and willing 
recipients, and in cases involving challenges to government interference with 
communication between private entities and citizens.200  But, the right of 
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access has been deemed to be less salient, if implicated at all, when individuals 
or entities have tried to compel government actors to disclose information in 
their possession.201  In the latter context, the courts seem to have 
acknowledged that the government should not operate in secrecy outside the 
eyes and ears of the people.202  However, the courts have been unwilling to 
interpret the First Amendment in a manner that arms individual citizens with 
the ability to demand government disclosure without government consent.203 
Accordingly, one could argue that recent government initiatives, discussed 
previously, which have curtailed the accessibility of information have not 
violated citizen access rights.  However, ongoing judicial disharmony 
regarding the extent to which the First Amendment protects the right of access 
in different contexts is unsettling in a wartime atmosphere in which the 
government’s compelling interest in preventing terrorism must be balanced 
against an equally compelling interest of the public for information necessary 
to find the proper balance between protecting public security and maintaining 
the integrity and accountability of government bodies. 
Executive Branch Wartime Tribunals 
Since the Supreme Court handed down its decision in Richmond 
Newspapers, there has been a quarter of a century of case law confirming that 
the public has a First Amendment right of access to a variety of criminal, civil, 
and administrative judicial proceedings.204  But it is not clear whether that right 
extends to wartime tribunals established by the executive branch.  The Court 
has never addressed whether the public has a First Amendment right of access 
to the military trials of enemy combatants captured during a war. 
If the Court were called upon to review the closure of such a proceeding, it 
could interpret its post-World War II precedent in Richmond Newspapers to 
mean that there is a First Amendment right of access mandating the 
presumption of open military trials.  This result would be most acceptable to 
staunch advocates of government transparency.  It also would be consistent 
with the view expressed by the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals when it ruled 
 
 201. Ctr. for Nat’l Sec. Studies v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 331 F.3d 918, 935 (D.C. Cir. 2003). 
 202. Id. at 925. 
 203. Id. at 937. 
 204. Butterworth v. Smith, 494 U.S. 624, 632 (1990) (statute prohibiting witness from forever 
disclosing testimony relating to alleged government misconduct before grand jury violates the 
First Amendment); Press-Enterprise Co., v. Superior Court of California for Riverside County, 
478 U.S. 1, 13 (1986) (qualified First Amendment right of access to criminal proceedings applies 
to preliminary hearings); Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft, 303 F.3d 681, 696 (6th Cir 2002) 
(drawing sharp lines between administrative and judicial proceedings would allow the legislature 
to artfully craft information out of the public eye); Publicker Indus., Inc. v. Cohen, 733 F.2d 
1059, 1070 (3rd Cir. 1984) stating that the (First Amendment embraces a right of access to civil 
trials as well as criminal trials). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2006] CITIZEN ACCESS AND GOVERNMENT SECRECY 27 
that the public and press had a First Amendment right of access to “special 
interest” deportation hearings convened during the War on Terrorism.205 
However, even if the Court ruled that there is a First Amendment right of 
access, the Court could rule that the right of access is outweighed by the 
government’s national security interests.  This decision would be consistent 
with recent federal court decisions permitting the executive branch to close 
special interest deportation hearings206 and withhold records requested under 
the FOIA.207  It also would be consistent with a long history of judicial 
deference to the executive branch during wartime, even when significant 
individual liberties were adversely affected.208 
On the other hand, the Court could avoid the need to balance national 
security and citizen access rights by ruling that there is no First Amendment 
right of public access to military trial proceedings.  In Richmond Newspapers, 
the Court ruled that a public right of access to criminal trials attached because 
they had always been open in the United States.209  Because prior military 
trials have been closed, such as those conducted during and immediately after 
World War II (the last time military trials of enemy combatants were 
conducted), the Court could find that there is an insufficient history of 
openness to warrant First Amendment access (experience).  In addition, it 
could rule that wartime military trials of enemy combatants are so unique that 
openness does not enhance the process or administration of justice in such 
proceedings (logic).  The Hamdan court hinted at this uniqueness when it 
distinguished such military commissions from a military court martial.210 
Thus, even in the case of judicial settings, where the right of access has 
been most robust, there are significant open questions as to the extent of access 
rights to particularized wartime judicial proceedings. 
Compelling the Government to Divulge Records 
Although proponents of disclosure may not be content with the decisions 
in Center for National Security Studies v. U.S. Department of Justice, and 
American Civil Liberties Union v. U.S. Department of Justice, neither decision 
is inconsistent with prior precedent regarding access to government-controlled 
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information.211  FOIA established enumerated exemptions to disclosure of 
government documents.212  The courts in these recent cases simply found that 
the information was not subject to disclosure and that the government’s 
reliance on the relevant exemptions was appropriate.213 
As a practical matter, the First Amendment right of access has been 
interpreted most narrowly in cases in which access to government facilities or 
documents was sought.214  In Center for National Security Studies, the D.C 
Circuit simply reaffirmed the view that the First Amendment does not 
“mandate[] a right of access to government information or sources of 
information within the government’s control.”215  In fact, when the Supreme 
Court recently addressed the constitutional right of access to information 
outside of a judicial context, it relied on Houchins, rather than Richmond 
Newspapers.216  The Bush administration’s extensive use of Executive Orders 
and legal privileges to withhold information from the public represents zealous 
reliance on this restrictive view of public access rights. 
The Flow of Information between Citizens 
Government interference with the flow of information between citizens is 
another troubling breach of the right to receive information.  There is a long 
line of precedent recognizing the right of citizens to receive information from 
each other.217  However, it does not appear that recent government efforts to 
protect information from disclosure have included pervasive attempts to 
interfere with the flow of information between citizens.  Then again, Section 
215 of the U.S.A. PATRIOT Act and the CIIA come close.  Section 215 of the 
U.S.A. PATRIOT Act forbids private entities or individuals from disclosing 
government inquiries into their patrons’ records.218  Although there is little 
evidence of widespread use of Section 215, the secrecy it mandates is designed 
to limit disclosure of such evidence.219  Because the House of Representatives 
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and the Senate recently voted to renew Section 215,220 the danger of 
government enforcement of private entity suppression of information remains.  
The threat of criminal prosecution for release of critical infrastructure 
information by government employees under the CIIA also poses an ongoing 
effort to gag those who might disclose information in the government’s 
possession. 
CONCLUSION 
In short, those who might support the exercise of government secrecy 
during the War on Terrorism have a significant body of jurisprudence on 
which to draw that suggests that the First Amendment does not protect the 
right to compel government disclosure of its activities.  However, as the 
representative cases and literature reviewed here indicate, that position has 
never been universally accepted among scholars or jurists. 
The lack of agreement among jurists has been highlighted in recent cases 
addressing access rights during the War on Terrorism.  For example, the Sixth 
Circuit ruling in Detroit Free Press that conducting closed deportation 
hearings violated the First Amendment was unanimous, three to zero.221  The 
Third Circuit’s North Jersey ruling that closing the hearings did not violate the 
First Amendment was split, two to one.222  In addition, both of the federal 
district court judges whose decisions were appealed in Detroit Free Press and 
North Jersey ruled that the practice of closing these deportation hearings 
violated the First Amendment.223  Although the D.C. Circuit ruled in Center 
for National Security Studies that the FOIA did not require the government to 
release information on alleged terrorist detainees, that decision also was split, 
two to one.224  Thus, when one considers the views expressed by individual 
judges in these important post-9/11 right of access cases, it is clear that the 
majority of them were troubled by the government’s secrecy efforts.225 
Given the lack of agreement among jurists, it is disingenuous to argue that 
the Constitution does not protect an overarching right of public access to 
government-controlled information simply because the Supreme Court has not 
given copious attention to it.  The interpretation of constitutional rights is not 
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static.  Many of the First Amendment rights we now have were not specifically 
articulated by the Supreme Court until the 20th century—often times in cases in 
which the Court rejected its own precedent.226  For example, in 1915 the Court 
ruled that the First Amendment did not protect movies.227  That decision was 
overruled in 1952.228  There was a time when the Court ruled that commercial 
speech was not protected.229  That changed in the mid 1970s.230  There was a 
time when any criticism of the government considered to be anarchist was not 
protected.231  That changed in 1969.232  There was a time when words tending 
to affront a listener were considered to be unprotected “fighting words.”233  
That changed in the early 1970s.234 
In these and a myriad of other cases in which the Supreme Court 
interpreted the First Amendment to protect what previously had been 
considered unprotected expression, the Court was not dissuaded by the 
Constitution’s lack of explicitness, or its own contradictory precedent.235  As 
Justice Burger noted in Richmond Newspapers, when addressing the argument 
that the Constitution does not spell out a right to attend trials, 
[C]ertain unarticulated rights are implicit in enumerated guarantees.  For 
example, the rights of association and of privacy, the right to be presumed 
innocent, and the right to be judged by a standard of proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt in a criminal trial, as well as the right to travel, appear nowhere in the 
Constitution or Bill of Rights.  Yet these important but unarticulated rights 
have nonetheless been found to share constitutional protection in common with 
explicit guarantees.236 
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Accordingly, the Court ruled that the First Amendment guaranteed public 
access to trial processes, even though just one year earlier the Court questioned 
whether such access was protected.237 
Unfortunately, the Court has not specifically extended its rationale in 
Richmond Newspapers to support an overarching First Amendment right of 
access in settings other than judicial proceedings or those ancillary to them.  
Given the failure of the Court to resolve the extent of the right of access 
conclusively, it has been left largely to the political process (e.g., the executive 
and legislative branches) to define what the government must disclose to the 
public.238  In the best of times this is perilous, because it gives government 
bodies that are accountable to the public the power to determine what 
information the public will have with which to hold them accountable.  In the 
worst of times, such as times of war, when government actors have never been 
at their best in defending civil liberties, it is a dire risk to finding the proper 
balance between individual liberty and government abuse that can come from 
secrecy. 
Paul Rosenzweig of the Heritage Foundation recently stressed that 
achieving both security and liberty as the nation combats terrorism 
is not a zero-sum game . . . .  So long as we keep a vigilant eye on police 
authority, so long as the federal courts remain open, and so long as the debate 
about governmental conduct is a vibrant part of the American dialogue, the 
risk of excessive encroachment on our fundamental liberties is remote.  The 
only real danger lies in silence and leaving policies unexamined.239 
It seems clear that achieving this necessary level of scrutiny is jeopardized if 
the information needed to engage in such civic participation is not available to 
United States citizens. 
Accordingly, it is time for the Supreme Court to revisit its restrictive view 
of citizen access rights outside of judicial settings that has been used to support 
government secrecy.  The Court’s silence on this issue since September 11, 
2001, is deafening.  Its careful deliberation is imperative.  How the Court 
assists the United States in resolving the balance between public access rights 
and government secrecy in the War on Terrorism will have much to say about 
the extent to which we value First Amendment rights at the beginning of the 
21st century and how much we value self-governance by and self determination 
of “the people.” 
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Therefore, the cry to the Court during the war on terrorism is urgent: Tear 
down the walls of government secrecy once and for all. 
 
